Assessment Sensitivity about Future Contingents, Vindication and Self-Refutation by Besson, Corine & Hattiangadi, Anandi
Assessment Sensitivity about Future Contingents,  
Vindication and Self-Refutation 
 
Corine Besson and Anandi Hattiangadi 
 
September 2019 
 
 
Abstract 
John MacFarlane has recently argued that his brand of truth relativism – 
Assessment Sensitivity – provides the best solution to the puzzle of future 
contingents: statements about the future that are metaphysically neither 
necessary nor impossible. In this paper, we show that even if we grant all of 
the metaphysical, semantic and pragmatic assumptions in terms of which 
MacFarlane sets and solves the puzzle, Assessment Sensitivity is ultimately 
self-refuting. 
 
 
Section 1. Introduction 
 
In several recent works, John MacFarlane (2003, 2008, 2014) appeals to his distinctive 
brand of relativism about truth – Assessment Sensitivity – to resolve the puzzle of future 
contingents: statements about the future that are neither necessary nor impossible, such 
as ‘There will be a sea battle tomorrow’. The way MacFarlane sets it up, at the heart of 
the puzzle lies a metaphysical assumption that he explicitly endorses: that the future is 
objectively open or unsettled.  
 
Now suppose that it is today objectively unsettled whether there will be a sea battle 
tomorrow; in some possible futures there is a sea battle, in others there is peace. 
According to MacFarlane, when we evaluate a current assertion of the proposition 
‘There will be a sea battle tomorrow’, we have clashing intuitions. From today’s 
perspective, the assertion strikes us as neither true nor false: it is true in some possible 
futures, but not in others – we have an ‘indeterminacy intuition’. Yet if we fast forward 
to the future, and view the previous day’s assertion from the midst of a sea battle, the 
assertion strikes us as true – we have a ‘determinacy intuition’. These intuitions seem to 
					
	
 
2 
lead to an incompatibility since the same assertion seems to be neither true nor false at 
some point and true at a later point. 
 
As MacFarlane sees it, ‘a satisfactory account of future contingents must give both 
intuitions their due (2003: 321-232),’ and Assessment Sensitivity is apt to do so. 
MacFarlane often contrasts his own semantics with Supervaluationism, the rival 
semantics that is most structurally similar to his own, and of which indeed the latter can 
be seen as an extension. While both semantics seem to be able to account for the puzzle 
of future contingents the way MacFarlane sets it up, the two theories are importantly 
different.1 As we shall see, one distinctive feature of Assessment Sensitivity is that the 
assessment sensitivity any ordinary proposition P gives rise to the assessment 
sensitivity of the truth predicate in a sentence such as ‘P is true’. In contrast, according 
to Supervaluationism, though P may be true by their definitions (‘supertrue’), ‘P is true’ 
need not be true in this way. Below, we will show that Assessment Sensitivity is self-
refuting, and what is more, that the lack of possible fallback strategies for Assessment 
Sensitivity stems precisely from the assessment sensitivity of ´P is true´. This leaves 
Supervaluationism at a dialectical advantage.2 
 
Section 2 outlines the Assessment Sensitivity solution to the puzzle and compares it 
briefly with the supervaluationist one. Section 3 shows that, while sophisticated, it 
cannot be ‘vindicated’ and in fact is self-refuting – two charges that we will define 
precisely. Section 4 considers and rejects three potential responses to the objection. 
Finally, Section 5 comes back to Supervaluationism and shows how, in light of the 
discussion in Section 4, it is at a dialectical advantage over Assessment Sensitivity. 
 
 																																								 																					
 
1 In his (2003) MacFarlane puts forward several objections to Supervaluationism in relation to future 
contingents. These are retracted in his (2008), where he claims that the superiority of Assessment 
Sensitivity over Supervaluationism is salient only in its treatment of the operator ‘actually’, which is not 
germane to the treatment of future contingents. See García-Carpintero (2013) for a critical discussion of 
the claim that Assessment Sensitivity’s treatment of ‘actually’ is superior to Supervaluationism. 
 
2 We thus leave aside other possible solutions to the puzzle of future contingents. See for instance our 
(2014 and forthcoming). See also Torre (2011) for a recent helpful survey and critical discussions of other 
possible semantic accounts of future contingents. 
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Section 2. The Problem of Future Contingents 
 
A natural way of fleshing out the idea that the future is objectively unsettled, which 
MacFarlane appeals to, is through so-called ‘Branch Theory’ (see e.g. Belnap and Green 
1994), an eternalist theory of time where past, present and future are equally real; and 
where time is like a rootless tree, with a single trunk representing the settled past, and 
multiple branches representing the unsettled future. On this view, there is an asymmetry 
between the past and present on the one hand and the future on the other: while there is 
at any moment a unique past and present, there are multiple future branches that are 
ontologically on a par. The future is objectively unsettled because no future is singled 
out as the future of the world.3 
 
Now, suppose that on Monday it is objectively unsettled whether a sea battle will occur 
on Tuesday and that Alice utters the following contingent, future tensed sentence: 
 
(1) There will be a sea battle tomorrow. 
 
The situation is represented by Figure 1: 
 
Here, w1 and w2 are distinct possible worlds that are qualitatively identical in their past 
and present, but which represent different ways the future might be: at w1 a sea battle 
occurs on Tuesday, but not at w2. Here we suppose with MacFarlane that for every 																																								 																					
 
3 See MacFarlane (2003, 2005). 
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world, it is determinate at that world which way the future is at that world. C0, C1 and 
C2 are particular contexts – sets of parameter values, including worlds, agents, locations 
and times.  
 
For convenience, let ‘W(Ci)’ denote the set of worlds contained in a context Ci (where 
‘Ci’ is a variable for contexts), such that: at C0, it is unsettled whether there is a sea 
battle on Tuesday, since both w1 and w2 are in W(C0). At C1 it is settled that there is a 
sea battle since only w1 is in W(C1); and at C2 it is settled that there is no sea battle since 
only w2 is in W(C2). 
 
Against this metaphysical background, we are meant to be torn between two intuitions 
when we evaluate Alice’s assertion: on Monday (at C0), we are in the grip of 
Indeterminacy, while on Tuesday (at C1 or C2), we are in the grip of Determinacy. 
 
Indeterminacy. What Alice said is neither true nor false. 
Determinacy. What Alice said was true (false). 
 
Indeterminacy and Determinacy conflict: what Alice said cannot both lack a truth 
value and be true (false).  
 
Nevertheless, MacFarlane offers a way to give both intuitions their due by appealing to 
Assessment Sensitivity, on which Alice’s assertion of (1) comes out as neither true nor 
false, and so incorrect, at C0, but true and so correct C1. Here is how the account goes. 
 
MacFarlane first defines an assessment sensitive truth predicate in terms of two key 
notions: a context of utterance: a set of parameter values, including worlds, agents, 
locations, times, representing the circumstances in which a sentence is uttered; and a 
context of assessment: a set of shiftable parameters from the context of utterance 
representing the perspective from which an asserted proposition can be assessed 
(MacFarlane, 2014: 78). This truth predicate applies to propositions (understood as sets 
of worlds). It is defined for future contingent propositions as follows (2014: 151): 
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Relativist Postsemantics for Truth (RPT). A proposition φ is true as used at Ci 
and as assessed at Cj iff for every w ∈ W (Ci, Cj), φ is true at w,  
     where W(Ci, Cj) =  W(Cj) if W(Cj) ⊂ W(Ci)  
     and W(Ci) otherwise. 
 
Given that the semantics is non-bivalent, falsity is not the dual of truth, but can be 
defined as truth of the negation, as follows: 
 
Relativist Postsemantics for Falsehood (RPF). A proposition φ is false as used 
at Ci and as assessed at Cj iff for every world w ∈ W (Ci,Cj), φ is false at w, 
     where W(Ci, Cj) =  W(Cj) if W(Cj) ⊂ W(Ci)  
     and W(Ci) otherwise 
 
Second, MacFarlane articulates norms of assertion to explain both our intuitions about 
the accuracy and inaccuracy of assertions of future contingents. Roughly, assertions are 
appropriate at a context of utterance and assessment iff they are accurate relative to both 
contexts: 
 
Accuracy. An attitude or speech act occurring at Ci is accurate as assessed from a 
context Cj iff its content [proposition] is true as used at Ci and assessed from Cj. 
(MacFarlane 2014: 127)  
 
For McFarlane, inaccuracy is the denial of Accuracy – for an assertion to be inaccurate, 
it is sufficient that it is not true as used at Ci and assessed from Cj, in which case it 
should be rejected: 
 
Retraction Rule. An agent in context Cj is required to retract an (unretracted) 
assertion of p made at Ci if p is not true as used at Ci and assessed at Cj. 
(MacFarlane 2014: 108) 
 
With this in place, Assessment Sensitivity purports to give Indeterminacy its due as 
follows. Given RPT, the proposition that there is a sea battle on Tuesday when used at 
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C0 and assessed at C0 is not true, since it is not true at w2 and so is not true at all worlds 
w ∈ W(C0, C0). Given RPF, the proposition that there will be a sea battle on Tuesday 
when used at C0 and assessed at C0 is not false, since it is not false at all worlds w ∈ 
W(C0, C0). Thus, the proposition that there is a sea battle on Tuesday is neither true nor 
false when used and assessed at C0.  
 
Furthermore, given Accuracy, Alice’s assertion of (1) is inaccurate when assessed at 
C0, since the proposition that Alice expresses in asserting (1) is not true as used at C0 
and assessed at C0. Given Retraction Rule, Alice ought to retract her assertion of (1) if 
she is challenged at C0 while it is still open that there will be no sea battle on Tuesday.  
 
Determinacy is given its due as follows. Given RPT, the proposition that there is a sea 
battle on Tuesday is true when used at C0 and assessed from C1 since it is true at every 
world w ∈ W(C0, C1). Given Accuracy, Alice’s assertion is accurate when assessed at 
C1, since the proposition it expresses is true at C1, and given Retraction Rule, she is 
not obligated to retract her (unretracted) assertion of (1) if she is challenged at C1.  
 
Thus, Assessment Sensitivity seems to give both Indeterminacy and Determinacy 
their due: it entails that what Alice said was neither true nor false when assessed at C0, 
yet it is true when assessed at C1; when assessed at C0, Alice’s assertion is inaccurate 
and should be retracted, but not when assessed at C1. 
 
Now for contrast, consider what would be a standard statement of Supervaluationism 
applied to our puzzle of future contingents (See Thomason 1970, García-Carpintero 
2008). On this semantics truth, or supertruth, requires the truth of a propositions at all 
the worlds of the context of utterance: 
 
Supervaluationism: A proposition φ is supertrue at a context of utterance C iff φ 
is true at every world w ∈ W(C), and φ is superfalse at a context of utterance C iff 
φ is false at every world w∈ W(C) 
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Supervaluationism is in a way Assessment Sensitivity minus contexts of assessments: 
there is only one context parameter, which is the context of utterance. 4 Like Assessment 
Sensitivity, Supervaluationism gives Indeterminacy its due in that it entails that what 
Alice says is neither supertrue nor superfalse: at C0, there are both worlds at which a sea 
battle occurs and worlds where no sea battle occurs. Supervaluationism can also give 
Determinacy its due if Determinacy is interpreted as the intuition that the very 
proposition expressed in (1) is true: the proposition that there is a sea battle on Tuesday 
is true, as uttered on Tuesday. This requires, somewhat controversially, that the truth-
predicate used to state Determinacy be tenseless, an assumption that MacFarlane 
endorses too.5 
 
The discussion of Supervaluationism will become useful when we consider 
contemporary assessments of assertions of future contingents – such as a contemporary 
assessment of Alice’s utterance of (1). Given that this is precisely such assessments that 
we think lead to the problem of vindication and the charge of self-refutation for 
Assessment Sensitivity, we present our argument first and then come back to 
Supervaluationism.  
 
Section 3. Self-Refutation and Vindication 
 
Roughly put, a theory is self-refuting if it can be ‘turned against itself’ (Kölbel 
2011:11). Here, more precisely, we are concerned with strict self-refutation, which we 
define as follows:  
  
Strict Self-Refutation. A theory T is strictly self-refuting iff the content of T, on 
its own or together with other plausible assumptions, entails T’s falsity. 
																																								 																					
 
4 We will stick to the labels ‘supertrue’ and ‘superfalse’ to clearly demarcate Supervaluationism from 
Assessment Sensitivity, even though the latter is an extension of the former. 	
5 See MacFarlane (2008, sct 8 for details). See Heck (2006) for criticism of this assumption that the truth 
predicate is tenseless directly addressed at Assessment Sensitivity’s treatment of future contingents. 
MacFarlane once argued (2003) that Supervaluationism could not give its due to Determinacy, precisely 
because of the lack of an assessment context parameter. This was largely due to the fact that he was then 
working with the notion of an utterance as the primary bearer of truth, not that of a proposition. 
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For instance, the proposition that I know that I know nothing is strictly self-refuting 
given the plausible assumption that knowledge is factive: the proposition that I know 
that I know nothing then entails that I know nothing, which entails that I do not know 
that I know nothing (Kölbel 2011). 
 
We now argue that Assessment Sensitivity strictly refutes itself in connection with its 
treatment of Indeterminacy: our first step is to show that while RPT and RPF entail 
that what Alice said is neither true nor false when assessed at (C0, C0), which, as we 
have just seen means that Assessment Sensitivity gives Indeterminacy its due, RPF 
however entails that the proposition that what Alice said is neither true nor false is false 
when assessed at (C0, C0). Our second step is to show that given some further plausible 
assumptions, this entails that the conjunction of RPT and RPF is false.  
 
 
(i) Vindication 
Concerning the first step, we can set it up as follows. We can suppose that Hugo 
witnesses Alice’s assertion of (1) on Monday, and gives voice to Indeterminacy by 
asserting the following contemporary assessment of Alice’s utterance: 
 
(2) What Alice said is neither true nor false. 
 
This situation is represented in Figure 2.  
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When applied to Hugo’s assertion of (2), RPF entails that what Hugo says is false when 
assessed at C0; where what Hugo asserts at C0 is the proposition that what Alice said is 
neither true nor false is false at w1. This is because, given that there is a sea battle at w1, 
it is true at that world that there is a sea battle on Tuesday, and so assessed from C1 
what Alice said is likewise true; and, given that there is no sea battle at w2, it is false at 
that world that there is a sea battle on Tuesday, and so assessed from C2 what Alice said 
is false.6 Since what Hugo says is false at every world w ∈ W (C0, C0), it is false when 
assessed at C0. Indeed, since it is false at both w1 and w2, what Hugo says is false at all 
contexts of assessment C0, C1 and C2. Call this the ‘Vindication Problem’:  
 
Vindication Problem. Assessment Relativism fails to vindicate Indeterminacy 
because it fails to entail that a statement of Indeterminacy is true.  
 
Indeterminacy entails that what Alice said is neither true nor false when used and 
assessed at C0. So we expect that (2), which simply states this, is also true: it must be 																																								 																					
 
6 Here we are assuming that if there is in fact a sea battle at a world w, then (assessed at that world) it is 
true that there is a sea battle at that world. Likewise, if there is in fact no sea battle at a world w, then 
(assessed at that world) it is false that there is a sea battle at that world. Of course, these assumptions 
could be challenged, but not only are they extremely natural, they are also invited by MacFarlane’s very 
semantic framework underpinned by its appeal to Branch Theory to model determinacy and 
indeterminacy, which is then reflected at the semantic level within a truth-value gap setting. 
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true on Monday that it is neither true nor false on Monday that there will be a sea battle 
on Tuesday. Yet, not only does the theory fail to show that (2) is true when assessed at 
C0, it entails that (2) is false when assessed at this context.  
 
This wreaks havoc with the associated theory of assertion: Alice says on Monday that 
there will be a sea battle on Tuesday. When used and assessed on Monday, what Alice 
says is neither true nor false. Yet, if Hugo asserts on Monday that what Alice just said is 
neither true nor false, thereby challenging her assertion, what he says is false when it is 
assessed on Monday. Thus, by Accuracy, Hugo’s assertion is inaccurate; by Retraction 
Rule, if Hugo’s assertion were to be challenged, he would be obligated to retract it, 
since the proposition he asserts is false when used and assessed on Monday. 
 
 
(ii) Self-Refutation 
So much for vindication, the first step in our argument against Assessment Sensitivity. 
Now to the second step, which concerns self-refutation. The vindication problem can be 
developed into a strict self-refutation charge given the following further plausible 
assumption:  
 
F1. The proposition that φ is false → ¬φ. 
 
F1 is an extremely natural assumption that one would be hard-pressed to give up, since 
it captures a core feature of our intuitive understanding of falsehood as truth of 
negation. Moreover, F1 fits with Assessment Sensitivity, since given RPF, every 
instance of F1 holds at every context of use and context of assessment. 
 
Now, let RP be the conjunction of RPT and RPF and let P be the following 
proposition:  
 
(P) What Alice said is neither true nor false.  
 
The Strict Self-Refutation Argument against RP goes as follows. 
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The Strict Self-Refutation Argument Against RP 
(i) RP    (Assumption) 
(ii) RP → P    (RP applied to Alice’s assertion (1)) 
(iii) RP → False(P)  (RP applied to Hugo’s assertion (2)) 
(iv) False(P)   ((i), (iii), Modus Ponens) 
(v) ¬P    ((iv), F1) 
___________ 
(vi) ∴ ¬RP   ((v), (ii), Modus Tollens) 
 
Thus, RP refutes itself. More precisely, given the plausible assumption, RP refutes 
itself. 
 
MacFarlane (2008: 97) discusses Supervaluationism in connection with contemporary 
assessment of utterances of future contingents, the case we have used in our argument 
against Assessment Sensitivity. He considers the case of someone who says of their 
own utterance:  
 
(*) ‘What I just said (when I said that it would be sunny tomorrow) is not true’.  
 
This claim is true but it does not come out true on a supervaluationist semantics. Given 
disquotation, which supervaluationists accept, the claim entails that it won’t be sunny 
tomorrow, which is not true given that at the context of utterance there are worlds at 
which it won’t be sunny tomorrow. Thus on such a supervaluationist semantics: 
 
 ‘… one cannot truly utter (*) or its negation.... Thus the semantic fact 
recorded in the metalanguage by the observation that neither (*) nor its 
negation is true at such a context is ineffable from the “internal” point of 
view.’ 
 
While it is unclear what exactly MacFarlane means by ‘the semantic fact… is ineffable 
from the “internal” point of view’, and he does not elaborate further on what this means, 
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we can interpret it as follows: a proposition such as (2) cannot be uttered in that the 
proposition that it expresses cannot be given the intuitively correct truth-value. But this 
is precisely the vindication charge that we have raised against Assessment Sensitivity. 
However MacFarlane does not seem to be aware that this very charge also befalls 
Assessment Sensitivity. Thus, like Assessment Sensitivity, it has a vindication problem. 
It entails that Hugo’s assertion in (2) is superfalse: it is not the case at w1 that (1) is 
neither supertrue nor superfalse; and is not the case at w2 that (1) is neither supertrue nor 
superfalse.  
 
MacFarlane suggests that the supervaluationist appeals to a determinate truth predicate, 
and that they rephrase (*) in terms of determinate (super)truth rather than simply in 
terms of (super)truth.7 We will consider the prospect of doing so below, both for 
Assessment Sensitivity and Supervaluationism. Our discussion reveals that it is not 
quite so straightforward for either semantics to simply reframe the puzzle of future 
contingents using a determinacy operator.8 
 
 
Section 4. Possible Responses 
 
There are several ways in which the defender of Assessment Sensitivity might respond 
to the self-refutation charge. Here we mention four seemingly attractive avenues that 
they might take and show that none is consistent with some key tenet of Assessment 
sensitivity. 
 																																								 																					
 
7 See García-Carpintero (2013) for an evaluation of this proposal from a supervaluationist perspective. 
 
8 In general, provided that we ignore higher-order indeterminacy, Supervaluationism entails that saying of 
a statement containing a supertruth predicate that it is neither supertrue nor superfalse is itself superfalse. 
In other words, if a statement P contains a determinacy operator, then P is neither determinately true nor 
determinately false is determinately false. It is just not possible that if P has this kind of determinacy, it is 
neither determinately true nor determinately not true that it has. Thus consider the standard case of 
vagueness. Take the following statement: “that Lucy is bald is supertrue’ is neither supertrue nor 
superfalse’. This statement is itself superfalse: if Lucy is bald is supertrue, it is determinately the case that 
she is bald. In this case it is determinate that there can’t be any indeterminacy about whether she is 
determinately bald. That is, it is determinately false that there is not such indeterminacy about her 
determinate baldness. 
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(i) Determinate Truth and Determinate Falsehood 
First, one might defend the view by reframing the puzzle of future contingents in terms 
of determinate truth rather than simply truth, 9  and of then arguing that the 
indeterminacy intuition – call it Indeterminacy* – should be better understood as the 
intuition that (1) is neither determinately true nor determinately false, where 
determinate truth and falsity can be understood as follows: 
 
Determinate Truth. A proposition φ is determinately true at Ci iff for every w ∈ 
W (Ci, Cj), φ is true at w,  
    where W(Ci, Cj) =  W(Cj) if W(Cj) ⊂ W(Ci)  
    and W(Ci) otherwise. 
 
Determinate Falsehood. A proposition φ is determinately false at Ci iff for every 
w ∈ W (Ci, Cj), φ is false at w,  
    where W(Ci, Cj) =  W(Cj) if W(Cj) ⊂ W(Ci)  
    and W(Ci) otherwise. 
 
Given this semantic set up, suppose now that when Hugo asserts (2) on Monday, he in 
fact expresses the proposition (PDET) – where the determinacy operator attaches to the 
truth predicates: 
 
(PDET) What Alice said is neither determinately true nor determinately false.  
 
That is to say, in full the claim made in (PDET) is that: the proposition that there will be a 
sea battle tomorrow [is neither determinately true nor determinately false].  
 
Given RP, if the content of Hugo’s assertion is (PDET), what he asserts is true: when 
assessed at C0, what Alice says is not determinately true, since it is not true at every w ∈ 																																								 																					
 
9 This kind of view is endorsed by Barnes and Cameron (2009, 2011) and García-Carpintero (2013), 
which he labels a ‘nonstandard form of supervaluationism’ (2013: 25). 
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W(C0, C0); it is also not determinately false, since it is not false at every w ∈ W(C0, C0). 
In this setting, the analogue of step (iii) of The Strict-Refutation Argument Against 
RP would say: RP → False(PDET). This step is false. 
 
However, first, this proposal radically departs from MacFarlane’s original 
understanding of the puzzle, which involved Indeterminacy, not Indeterminacy*. 
Indeterminacy and Determinacy are meant to articulate ordinary intuitions we have 
about the puzzle of future contingents, ordinary intuitions that we have about openness 
and closeness of the past present and future. An argument would need to be given as to 
why, besides it being semantically convenient, such intuitions have to be framed in 
terms of Indeterminacy* and Determinacy*.10 
 
Second, this semantic proposal requires that it is only partially applied. Indeed, step (iii) 
has been blocked only because, somewhat artificially and in an ad hoc manner, we have 
not applied Determinate Truth and Determinate Falsehood to the whole of the 
argument, and in particular not to ‘False’ in ‘False(P DET)’. But it seems that we should 
apply Determinate Truth and Determinate Falsehood throughout the argument, as 
nothing in the semantic machinery of Assessment Sensitivity so interpreted stops us 
from doing so. But if we do this, the Strict Self-Refutation Argument can be 
reformulated. Let RPDET be the conjunction of Determinate Truth and Determinate 
Falsehood. First we get a version of the vindication problem. Given RPDET, the 
proposition (PDET) is determinately false when assessed at C0, since it is false at every 
world w ∈ W(C0): it is false at w1, where there is a sea battle and what Alice said is thus 
determinately true; it is false at w2, where there is no sea battle what Alice said is 
determinately false.11 
 
Thirdly, the proposal can be shown to be strictly self-refuting given the following 
plausible assumption:  
 																																								 																					
 
10 See our (2014) for further discussion. 
 
11 Recall here that at each world w, it is determinate which future holds at w. 
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F2. Determinately False(φ) → ¬φ. 
 
Let RPDET the combination of Determinate Truth and Determinate Falsehood. 
 
The Strict Self-Refutation Argument against RPDET 
(i) RPDET    (Assumption) 
(ii) RPDET → PDET    (RPDET applied to Alice’s assertion (1)) 
(iii) RPDET → Det False(PDET)  (RPDET applied to Hugo’s assertion (2)) 
(iv) Det False(PDET)   ((i), (iii), Modus Ponens) 
(v) ¬P1 DET    ((iv), F2) 
___________ 
(vii) ∴ ¬RP    ((vi), (ii), Modus Tollens) 
 
Thus, RPDET is self-refuting, and reformulating the original intuition in terms of 
Indeterminacy* does not on its own help to avoid the strict self-refutation charge. 
 
There are other possible routes to avoid the strict self-refutation charge than the one just 
discussed, that also go by reformulating Indeterminacy. Let us consider one briefly 
here. For instance one might think that Indeterminacy should be viewed as rejecting 
that what Alice said is either true or false rather than as asserting that what she said is 
neither true nor false. Note that this is only going to block step (iii) of the Strict Self-
Refutation Argument against RP if rejection is not the dual of assertion. However, this 
kind of view severs the conceptual connection between assertion and truth, and rejection 
and falsity, and the way MacFarlane defines Accuracy and Rejection Rule suggests that 
he thinks that there is a conceptual connection between assertion, and truth and rejection 
(Retraction Rule) and non-truth. 
 
 
(ii) Non Assessment Sensitive Truth Predicate: The Dyadic View 
The considerations just made suggest that to avoid the strict self-refutation charge, it 
must be denied that Assessment Sensitivity (either RP or RPDET) applies to assertions 
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containing the standard, English or object language, truth predicate, such as that in 
Hugo’s assertion of (2).  
 
For instance, one might reject step (iii) of The Strict Refutation Argument Against 
RP as illicit on the grounds that it requires an application of Assessment Relativism to 
utterances of sentences containing the truth predicate that Hugo is using. Thus, one 
might argue that it is not the case that RP → False(P), because Assessment Sensitivity 
does not apply to propositions expressed by utterances of ordinary English sentences 
containing a truth predicate. 
 
To do so, one might for instance take truth to be a relation between a proposition and 
specific parameters, which entails that the predicate ‘is true’ as it occurs in Hugo’s 
assertion of (2) in fact expresses a dyadic property. On this view, Hugo’s assertion of 
(2) at C0 expresses the proposition (Pdyadic): 
 
(Pdyadic) What Alice said is not true at (C0, C0) and not false at (C0, C0). 
 
More precisely, the claim made in (Pdyadic) is that: the proposition that there will be a sea 
battle tomorrow [is neither true-at-(C0, C0) nor false-at-(C0, C0)]. 
 
Given this account of the truth predicate, all of the foregoing strict self-refutation 
charges can be avoided. Given RPT, (Pdyadic) is true at (C0, C0), since it is true at every 
world w ∈ W (C0, C0). While at w1 there is a sea battle on Tuesday, it is true at w1 that 
the proposition that there is a sea battle on Tuesday is neither true nor false when used 
and assessed at C0. Similarly, while at w2 there is no sea battle on Tuesday, it is true at 
w2 that the proposition that there is a sea battle on Tuesday is neither true nor false when 
used and assessed at C0.  
 
However, treating the English truth predicate as dyadic assessment insensitive predicate 
in this way is incompatible with the core of McFarlane’s relativist account of truth as 
assessment sensitive. Indeed he articulates one of his key commitment about the 
English truth predicate as follows:  
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‘What makes one a relativist about truth’, MacFarlane says, ‘is a 
commitment to the assessment sensitivity of some [p]ropositions 
(MacFarlane 2014: 52).’  
 
He explains:  
 
‘[I]f the language can express any assessment sensitive propositions, “true” 
will also be assessment sensitive, since if p is assessment sensitive, the 
proposition that p is true must be assessment sensitive too (2014:93).’  
 
Thus, MacFarlane takes the English truth predicate to expresses an assessment sensitive, 
monadic property, specified as follows:  
 
Semantics for monadic ‘is true’ (SMIT). ‘True’ expresses the same property at 
every context of use—the property of being true. The extension of this property at 
a circumstance of evaluation e is the set of propositions that are true at e. 
(MacFarlane, 2014:93) 
 
Given this, in general ‘p is true’ does not express the proposition that p is true at (Ci, 
Cj); it simply expresses the proposition that p is true. Do the dyadic route is 
fundamentally not one that MacFarlane wishes to take. 
 
Moreover, while this may not be strictly self-refuting, treating the truth predicate as 
dyadic and therefore absolute does in a certain sense ‘turn’ MacFarlane’s account of 
future contingents ‘against itself’, to use our informal way of thinking of thinking of 
self refutation: if (2) expresses (Pdyadic), then it is not only true at (C0, C0): it is also true 
as assessed at C1, and as assessed at C2 because it is true at both w1 and w2, and hence 
true at every world w ∈ W (C0, C1) and at every world w ∈ W (C0, C2). There 
assessment sensitivity to be found there. 
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(iii) Non Assessment Sensitive Truth Predicate: The Metalinguistic View 
Finally, another way to attempt to block The Strict Refutation Argument Against RP 
at step (iii) is to go metalinguistic. On this view, the truth predicate that occurs in 
Hugo’s utterance of (2) is not part of the object language – not part of the ordinary 
English truth predicate – but part of a metalanguage which is non assessment sensitive. 
Here, idea that the metalanguage should be non assessment sensitive is motivated by 
blocking both the vindication problem and the self-refutation charge. If this 
metalinguistic truth predicate is not itself assessment sensitive, the truth values of 
sentences containing it do not vary with contexts of assessment. In this setting, Hugo’s 
utterance of (2) does not really express the proposition that what Alice said is neither 
true nor false, but rather the proposition that what Alice said satisfies ‘is neither true 
nor false’; where that predicate is non assessment sensitive. The upshot would be that 
the proposition expressed by (1) is assessment sensitive but that expressed by (2) is not. 
 
The key complaint here is as above, when discussing using a dyadic truth predicate to 
account for Hugo’s utterance in (2): though this move might respect the spirit of SMIT, 
it does so at the cost of the assessment sensitivity of the English language truth 
predicate, which is at odds with the core thesis of Assessment Relativism. Furthermore, 
the metalinguistic proposal seems to be a non-starter for reasons that go beyond these 
theoretical commitments. For the metalinguistic proposal to work, there must be no 
object language truth predicate in English for Hugo to use—a view that few will find 
attractive. 
 
 
Section 5. ‘Ineffability’, Assessment Sensitivity and Supervaluationism 
 
We think there is little hope for Assessment Sensitivity to escape the vindication 
problem and strict self-refutation. The view remains ‘ineffable’, to pick up 
MacFarlane’s phrase again, in a way that makes it wholly objectionable. What of 
Supervaluationism? The ineffability generalizes to any account with the following 
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similar non-bivalent structure: an assertion of a future contingent is true at a context 
only if it is true at every world of that context; it is false at that context only if it is false 
at every such world. This includes Supervaluationism.  
 
However, supervaluationists may not feel the pressure of the objections raised in 
Section 3 in the same way as defenders of Assessment Sensitivity. For instance, 
supervaluationists can coherently deny that Supervaluationism applies to assertions 
containing the standard, English or object language truth predicate, such as Hugo’s 
assertion of (2). They might argue that their supervaluationist semantics is not designed 
to apply to propositions expressed by assertions containing the supertruth predicate (or 
‘determinately true’). They might for instance be attracted to a metaliguistic reply on 
the grounds that given that the supertruth predicate is perfectly determinate, it is not 
designed to be treated just like any other expression of English. Thus they may have a 
good case against step (iii) of The Strict Refutation Argument Against RP or, more 
likely, of The Strict Refutation Argument Against RPDET, given that 
supervaluationsts might be tempted to restate the puzzle in terms of Indeterminacy* 
rather than Indeterminacy. This would be ill-advised, as we have argued, given the 
lack of intuitive motivation for such a move, but it seems nonetheless that they have 
some conceptual space to do so. 
 
Again, this line of response is not open to the defender of Assessment Sensitivity. This 
is because part of the view is that, as McFarlane explicitly claims that ‘P is true’, just 
like ‘P’, is assessment sensitive: assessment sensitivity applies to any claim in the 
object, natural, language and that incudes the truth predicate that belongs to it. Thus, 
Assessment Relativism, unlike Supervaluationism, is specifically designed to account 
for sentences containing its own truth predicate, and so cannot avoid refuting itself. 
Given this, it appears that, contrary to what seemed at the end of Section 2, 
Supervaluationism is at a dialectical advantage over Assessment Sensitivity: giving up 
on assessment sensitivity for all sentences of English containing a truth predicate is 
giving up on the core of Assessment Sensitivity. Thus for the defender of Assessment 
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Sensitivity, the choice seems to be between giving up a core semantic tenet and being 
vulnerable to the Vindication Problem and the Self-Refutation charge.12   
																																								 																					
 
12 Many thanks to the participants to the Diaophora Workshop V: Determinism and Open Choice, 
University of Neuchâtel, for a helpful discussion. Special thanks to Stephan Torre and Hartry Field for 
comments on a draft of this paper.  
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